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Abstract 
Despite many passing references to contemporary frontiers of thought such as cybernetics and complexity theory, Tarnished 
Gold, a self-published book, leads the reader towards critical visions of clinical research enterprise that are more linked to 
the past than to the present or the future. Along the way, Evidence-Based Medicine is taken as the enemy, but is consistently 
misrepresented. The authors are seriously under-informed regarding contemporary issues and controversies related to the 
design of clinical research as well as the cognitive aspects of clinical practice.  They ignore the relevance of narrative and 
relationship-centered medicine to those issues and controversies. The actual challenges of healthcare in our time and its 
relationship to clinical research are largely avoided. As a result, “Tarnished Gold” fails to illuminate or inform lessons 
already learned from the controversies that have occurred since the appearance of EBM. More importantly, the authors fail 
to observe that the terms of the debate between EBM and its critics have changed in the direction of an integrative approach, 
based on considerations of not only the logic of scientific inference, but of contemporary understanding of clinical reasoning 
and of the forms of knowledge that underlie it. Some of those terms are addressed by this review. 
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“One would be remiss to say that EBM and its practice is a product of physicians alone. Technology has had a large role in the 




“Tarnished Gold” [2] is a book authored by Steve Hickey 
and Hilary Roberts, two PhD’s who otherwise have co-
authored and published numerous volumes espousing the 
healing properties of Vitamin C.  It is ostensibly dedicated 
to discrediting errors and follies attributed by the authors to 
“evidence-based medicine” (EBM). The back cover of the 
paperback concludes with a regretful statement:  
 
“It is time for medical practitioners to discard EBM’s 
tarnished gold standard, reclaim their clinical autonomy 
and provide individualized treatments to patients.” 
 
Tarnished Gold (TG) is self-published and we presume 
the above statement to have been crafted or at least 
approved by, the authors themselves. It lends an initial 
undercurrent of nostalgia to the text, even as the book itself 
wanders through complex and disconnected pathways. 
Despite many passing references to contemporary frontiers 
of thought such as cybernetics and complexity theory, 
Hickey and Roberts’ dissertation ultimately leads the 
reader more towards visions of the past than of the future.  
The actual challenges of healthcare in our time and its 
relationship to clinical research are largely avoided.   
Reading Tarnished Gold (TG) is a bewildering 
experience. A passionate polemic against EBM is pursued 
obsessively throughout the volume. However, the reader 
rapidly discovers that the authors have an extremely 
superficial acquaintance with the literature and institutions 
of EBM. They refer several times to “The Cochrane 
Foundation”, apparently referring to the well known 
Cochrane Collaboration and its work to assemble 
electronically accessible databases of trials, systematic 
reviews and health services research. A reader with even 
casual familiarity with the EBM literature rapidly becomes 
aware that the representations of EBM within TG are 
grossly distorted and begins to suspect that this is not a 
volume about EBM at all. Rather, EBM is being used by 
Hickey and Roberts as a convenient ‘whipping boy’ for the 
purpose of advancing a deeper, anti-establishment, agenda. 
The ‘establishment’ in this case is the prevailing 





framework of biomedical research - both basic and clinical 
- and its relationship to healthcare. The actual agenda of 
TG appears to emerge towards the end, as the content turns 
in the direction of a topic otherwise dear to its authors: the 
healing powers of vitamin C and the alleged suppression of 
recognition of those powers by the research enterprise that 
is EBM. Significantly, one individual identified by the TG 
authors as an adversary of research on megadose vitamin C 
as a treatment for paralytic poliomyelitis is Albert Sabin, 
the developer of the oral polio vaccine, the global 
administration of which has all but eradicated the disease 
worldwide [3]. Hickey and Roberts do not mention this. 
We cannot avoid noticing their emphasis, in their 
Acknowledgement section, on liaisons with the British 
Society for Ecological Medicine, an organization whose 
website home page conspicuously features links to articles 
warning of the dangers of immunizations [4].   
Agenda notwithstanding, as an anti-establishment 
critique of today’s biomedical research enterprise, 
Tarnished Gold is unsatisfying. It consistently not only 
misrepresents EBM, but also is seriously under-informed 
regarding the contemporary issues and controversies about 
the design of clinical research, the cognitive aspects of 
clinical practice and the relevance of narrative and 
relationship-centered medicine to those issues and 
controversies. The authors furthermore fail to address the 
content of the extensive literature of debate regarding 
EBM or of the content of the many published critiques that 
have appeared in the pages of the Journal of Evaluation of 
Clinical Practice and of other major medical journals, in 
the course of the 20 years since EBM appeared on the 
scene. 
Given the misguided and agenda-ridden character of 
Tarnished Gold and the fact that it is certainly destined to 
have an extremely limited impact, is it a waste of time to 
review and discuss it?  By touching upon a broad spectrum 
of issues related to healthcare and delivery, including 
foundational issues of biomedical science, albeit in an 
amateurish and superficial manner, Hickey and Roberts’ 
book addresses the scope of the dilemma that health 
practitioners and their patients face, in very practical ways, 
on a day to day basis. The fact that they have selected 
EBM as the embodiment of evil within the citadel that 
they, for their own reasons, feel impelled to assault, is also 
salient. For these reasons, we believe it useful to use TG, 
including its misconceptions and distortions, as vehicles 




“Ready, Fire, Aim”: Who is the 
enemy?  
 
Tarnished Gold, even as it initiates a relentless diatribe 
against EBM as ‘the enemy’, reflects an inconsistent and 
ever changing interpretation of the origin and nature of the 
adversary. In the early pages of the book, Hickey and 
Roberts commit themselves to a published definition of 
evidence-based medicine framed in terms of the context of 
individual patient care: 
“Evidence based medicine is the conscientious, explicit, 
and judicious use of current best evidence in making 
decisions about the care of individual patients” [5]. 
 
Earlier in the chapter, the authors attribute the origins 
of EBM to the discipline of clinical epidemiology [6]. 
Shortly thereafter, the authors suggest that EBM is largely 
a pawn of “corporate medicine, governments and the 
medical establishment.” Still earlier, in the preface to TG, 
the authors have suggested that “EBM …developed from 
organized medicine”. Returning to the first chapter, the TG 
authors assert that “...the origins of EBM lie in the legal 
system.” This is apparently based on little more than the 
observation that information from research, defined as 
“evidence” and the concept that some evidence is 
admissible and some not, bears some resemblance to the 
use of the term “evidence” in judicial proceedings. In other 
contexts not noted by the authors of TG, the origins of 
EBM have been attributed to the results of variations 
research [7,8].  
Is there a “true” historical attribution of the evils (if 
you are an adversary) or the fruits (if you are an advocate) 
of EBM?  We, based on over 15 years of close 
collaboration with founders of the EBM movement, 
previously provided a critical history of EBM [9] as it was 
officially formulated in 1992 [10]. That formulation 
pertained to teaching and practice regarding the care of 
individual patients and led to incorporation of much of the 
content to be found in standard EBM texts into curricula of 
competency-based graduation medical education [11]. 
However, the term “EBM” also disseminated with 
lightning speed to encompass many additional dimensions 
[7,12]. Furthermore, the phrase “evidence-based” had 
already been interjected into the medical literature in the 
context of criteria for clinical practice guidelines, a context 
extending beyond that of care of individual patients [13]. 
Hence, the issue of the relationship of healthcare policy to 
scientific evidence was already on the table at the point 
that the term “evidence-based medicine” was put forward 
in the pages of a major medical journal as a “new paradigm 
of teaching and practice of medicine” [10].   
To summarize, over the course of over 40 years since 
Sackett and Feinstein individually developed the science of 
clinical epidemiology [6,14] the need to integrate 
information from clinical and health services research into 
clinical policy and practice has become part of the fabric of 
the healthcare system, from the level of national healthcare 
regulation, all the way down to that of the training of 
clinicians in all disciplines. This has been driven 
throughout by the ever expanding explosion of published 
research [9,15] and of universal  electronic access to such 
information.  Hence, “EBM”, once a new buzz term 
affixed to an over-reaching educational initiative [10], no 
longer constitutes a well-defined or compelling target of  
dissent.  Efforts to make it such, begin to call up images of 
a bygone era. Much more salient is the recognition that 
many of the major challenges facing healthcare in our time 
revolve around issues which relate to the imperative to 
integrate the worlds of scientific research and healthcare 
delivery, healthcare policy, the care of individual patients 
and the science and the art of clinical medicine. The 
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authors of Tarnished Gold appear oblivious to these 
challenges as they march inevitably towards their apparent 
goal, exemplified by the championing of potential 
effectiveness of megadoses of vitamins in the treatment of 
an infectious disease that no longer exists. 
 
 
The EBM Wars 
 
Vehement as is Tarnished Gold in its critique of EBM, the 
authors appear largely oblivious to the literature of dissent 
to which one might expect them to have been drawn. The 
initial advocates of “EBM”, as a prescription for teaching 
clinical medicine, aroused great ire within the medical 
literature, not because they suggested that literacy in 
reading and interpreting clinical research was a useful 
point of emphasis in the education of physicians, but 
because, referring to the writings of Thomas Kuhn [16], 
they also claimed to be defining a ‘new paradigm’ for the 
teaching and practice of medicine [10]. This claim was 
rapidly recognized to be both mistaken and potentially 
dangerous. The often cited 1992 ‘manifesto’ [10] was 
framed from a narrow, epidemiologically weighted, 
perspective. Posed as a “new paradigm”, the suggestion 
that consideration of clinical research is routinely relevant 
to clinical decision-making, was widely interpreted as an 
assault on the integrity and importance of many 
dimensions of clinical expertise that require a lifetime to 
master [17]. New disciplines such as narrative medicine 
[18] had emerged to address these dimensions.  EBM 
advocates soon acknowledged that consideration of patient 
values and preferences - and of practice context and 
clinical circumstances - not only of information from 
clinical research, are needed informants of clinical 
decision-making [19-21]. However, neither in those 
sources, nor in subsequent EBM literature, have products 
and tools been developed that offer an integrated solution 
to the challenge to practice posed by the explosion of 
research information [9,22,23]. Rather, the debate itself has 
served to illuminate crucial dimensions of the problem and, 
most importantly, the level upon which its solution must be 
sought. These include the necessary relationship between 
the design and interpretation of clinical research and 
foundational medical knowledge [24], the necessarily 
indirect relevance of research performed on populations to 
the care of individual patients [25] and even the need to 
reconceptualize the prevailing foundational model of 
medicine [26]. Locating the proper position of information 
from clinical research within a unifying and adequate 
epistemological hierarchy constitutes an essential aspect of 
the problem and its solution. Illustrating the role of EBM 
advocacy in motivating critical dialogue, a recent, weak 
attempt by some of the original proponents of EBM at 
addressing philosophical challenges to EBM as a 
‘paradigm’ [27], led to an even more systematic reflection 
on the part of ourselves and others such as Miles on 
essential issues affecting conceptual integration [23,28].   
Hickey and Roberts, if they are aware of the substance 
of this 20 year long debate, largely ignore it in the course 
of pursuing their own critique. They stress the importance 
of what they call “the ecological fallacy’, that is, the failure 
to distinguish between population averages drawn from 
clinical research and the direct likelihood of an outcome 
within a single individual. However, rather than exploring 
the implications of this dilemma in depth, they use it as a 
pretext for virtually dismissing the relevance of  clinical 
research as currently performed and published to practice. 
They cryptically label EBM as a manifestation of a social 
constructivist outlook [29], overlooking the self-labeling of 
EBM by its originators as positivist [27], a label with 
which we concur [23]. Most importantly, Hickey and 
Roberts fail to observe that the terms of the debate between 
EBM and its critics have changed considerably over recent 
years.   
Although EBM advocates may have brought little new 
to the debate in recent years, the tone of much of the 
criticism has shifted away from the polarization of the 90’s 
in favor of a more concerted quest for conceptual 
resolution.  Sehon et al [30] observed that EBM’s claim to 
represent a scientific revolution was unsupported by its 
content, which essentially amounted to no more than a 
prescription for wise use of information from clinical 
research to guide practice. They suggest that the holistic 
approach of Quine allows escape from the constraints of 
positivism. Although not directly addressing the relational 
and narrative realm within which living patients are to be 
recognized as persons, Sehon et al. suggest the existence 
of a continuum within which patients’ and practitioners’ 
experience and evidence from randomized trials, can be 
regarded as essential ingredients of healthcare actions. 
More recently, the need for conceptual and epistemological 
integration has begun to appear in critical writings 
regarding EBM [31,32]. Our own inquiries [23] lead us 
beyond the pragmaticism of Quine and to the relevance of 
constructivism as embodied in the writings of Freire [33]. 
This notion of social constructivism has nothing to do with 
the lapse into subjectivism characteristic of contructivist 
writings cited by Hickey and Roberts. We [23] and others 
[34], perceive that potential solutions to the dilemma posed 
by Cartesian dualism may be found in complexity theory 
[35]. It is within this domain that the dichotomies between 
verificationism and realism, that is, the “science” versus 
the “art” of medicine, seem most fruitfully sought. From 
this perspective, although EBM appears largely trapped 
within the past, it nonetheless appears less and less an 
important culprit.  Far from defining the goal of integrated 
practice, EBM helps illuminate the path through which the 
actual goal may be pursued in a fashion that addresses the 
complexity of 21st Century healthcare. The most important 
weakness of TG is, perhaps, that it is tangential to today’s 
issues. We will confine the rest of our discussion to themes 
that appear most pertinent to those issues. 
 
 
EBM and the Research Enterprise 
  
Throughout Tarnished Gold, the authors refer to EBM and 
to the industry-dominated sector of the clinical research 
enterprise, interchangeably. If the EBM literature 
constituted an uncritical endorsement of clinical trials, 





such an equation might be justified. After all, only a few 
years ago, Richard Horton, Editor of The Lancet, 
reviewing a book by Sheldon Krimsky [36], proclaimed 
that “Journals have devolved into information-laundering 
operations for the pharmaceutical industry” [37]. His 
sentiments were echoed by the former Editor of the British 
Medical Journal [38]. Missed by Hickey and Roberts is 
that the founders and advocates of EBM have consistently 
been in the forefront of efforts to immunize healthcare 
professionals against the effects of industry-related 
subterfuge [39]. Furthermore, EBM founders and 
advocates have rigorously illuminated sources of 
researcher bias previously unappreciated even in academic 
quarters and they have done this in ways that reach out to 
clinicians and educators.  Examples include the misuse of 
composite endpoints, in which clinically trivial outcomes 
that occur frequently are summed with rarely occurring 
major outcomes in a fashion that falsely inflates the 
clinical importance of trial results [40]; erroneous 
approaches to subgroup analysis [41]; demonstrations of 
the magnitude of inflation of trial effects when trials are 
stopped early for benefit [42] and the subterfuge embodied 
in the emphasis on relative rather than absolute measures 
of effect [43]. 
Hickey and Roberts advance warnings regarding the 
premature stopping of clinical trials and the statistical 
significance of clinically insignificant effects as ‘evidence’ 
in support of their anti-EBM discourse [2].  They make no 
mention of the role of EBM founders and advocates in 
providing professional readers and educators with well-
researched demonstrations and tools aimed at exposing and 
neutralizing these very subterfuges. Has EBM, through its 
emphasis on randomized trials and despite extensive 
efforts to expose the methods of researcher and marketing 
bias, ultimately served to advance proprietary interests?  
Whatever future historians may conclude, the answer to 
this question is vastly more complex than the authors of 
TG seem prepared to deal with. To the extent to which 
they are genuinely concerned about the corruption of 
research by proprietary interests, they appear to us to have 
overlooked an important ally in the course of their focus on 
EBM as the adversary of science.  
Related to the nature of EBM and ‘establishment’ 
interests and biases, the TG authors express concern with 
overuse of technology and blind endorsement of screening 
[2]. Again, they fail to acknowledge EBM as their allies in 
these concerns. The 2009 revised recommendations for 
breast cancer screening in younger women [44], based on a 
systematic review of trial evidence [45], unleashed an 
outcry of political protest in the United States [46]. 
Dissenters from the limited screening recommendations 
included right wing politicians, stakeholders within 
medical imaging specialties and patient advocacy groups. 
This demonstrated a very different alignment between 
establishment interests and EBM methodology than that 




RCTs, clinical practice and policy 
  
EBM has been a users’ and consumers’ movement in 
healthcare. EBM does not produce research, as frequently 
implied by Hickey and Roberts. Rather, it summarizes and 
appraises it and develops recommendations based upon the 
assessment of quality and the magnitude of the results of 
studies. However, in one sense, Hickey and Roberts are 
correct in their assertion of an alignment between EBM 
and research. The principle of a hierarchy of study designs, 
with randomized controlled trials (RCTs) at the top of the 
pyramid for most research questions, is central to the 
methodology of EBM. When certain specifications 
regarding component studies are fulfilled, meta-analysis 
may further increase the precision of estimates of effect 
and of other outcomes [47]. Hickey and Roberts take 
vehement issue with the hegemony of RCTs within the 
evidence hierarchy and are, if possible, even more strident 
when it comes to denouncing meta-analysis [2]. The two 
issues are closely related. Meta-analyses may be performed 
in a fashion that includes any category of study design. 
However, meta-analyses of randomized trials of treatment 
and prevention are particularly prominent in the literature 
and - until recently - were the sole product of the Cochrane 
Collaboration.  
The TG authors’ objections to meta-analyses and 
systematic reviews of treatment are largely based on the 
exclusion by those analytical designs of observational 
studies. However, Hickey and Roberts also point to the 
attempt to locate and include unpublished data in 
systematic reviews, a required reporting element within the 
PRISMA guideline [48], compliance with which is 
required by most major journals as a condition for 
acceptance of such a review for publication. Once again, 
they appear seriously uninformed with respect to the EBM 
and methodological literature. They fail to mention that 
failure to include unpublished data in a meta-analysis may 
result in dangerous over-estimation of treatment effects 
due to withholding of negative trials from publication by 
pharmaceutical sponsors. Examples of this in the area of 
medications for psychiatric illnesses have recently 
attracted major attention [49-51]. Such “reporting bias” 
leads to over prescribing of expensive drug therapy and 
unwarranted exposure of patients to adverse effects of 
medicines. Susceptibility to publication bias is stressed as a 
key factor in evaluating the quality of systematic reviews 
in the EBM literature [52].  
The notion that EBM overemphasizes the importance 
of RCTs to the exclusion of evidence from other types of 
research furthermore is not new [9]. Such views have been 
voiced frequently over the years, including from illustrious 
sources [53,54]. Hickey and Roberts couch their opposition 
to emphasis on RCTs in a novel fashion. They challenge 
the premises of statistical inference that form the basis of 
how trial data is conventionally reported and counterpose 
their own account of Baysean statistical methods [2]. Much 
of their discussion of statistical issues is arcane. However, 
their description of a “Baysean trial” that a practitioner 
might do for himself to determine the apparent 
effectiveness of a therapy among his own patients is of 
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some interest. It corresponds to what is being called 
“practice-based research” [55]. Here is yet another 
example of the TG authors looking blindly backwards, 
rather than to the frontiers of today’s healthcare 
environment. They make no mention of the concept of 
comparative effectiveness research (CER) [56,57], a 
development that is moving clinical research away from 
exclusive emphasis on trials of efficacy performed under 
research conditions and towards the issue of what actually 
works in real world practice. The concept of a strictly 
controlled trial with tight inclusion criteria is being 
challenged by that of a pragmatic trial, designed to 
simulate real world conditions and to carry greater 
relevance to healthcare decisions [58,59]. However, the 
implications of the CER movement go far beyond the 
design of randomized trials.  Interventions characterized by 
the inherent need for patient preference and participation 
may be incompatible with a randomized design [60-62]. 
Related to CER, still another dimension of research has 
recently emerged.  Called “patient-oriented research”, it 
seeks directly to engage patients themselves in the clinical 
research enterprise, as co-designers and advisors of study 
design [63].   
Within the framework of evidence-based guidelines, 
the Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, 
Development and Evaluation (GRADE) system, 
incorporates a principle of equity, based on methodological 
criteria, of observational studies in relationship to 
randomized trials [64,65]. Randomized trials of poor 
quality may be rated lower and observational studies of 
high quality may be rated higher, breaking the rigidity of 
the classical EBM hierarchy of evidence. Importantly the 
architects of the GRADE system include some of the 
prominent founders of the EBM movement. Furthermore, 
new guidelines for systematic reviews of CER explicitly 
call for inclusion of observational studies in addition to 
randomized trials [47]. Still further, sophisticated 
challenges, coupled with innovative approaches to the 
ability of evidence-based guidelines to effectively predict 
benefit for individual patients, are being advanced by some 
of the founders of the very concept of such guidelines [66].  
These modifications to the traditional EBM formula 
are transformative. They reflect the advent of a new era of 
clinical research in which at least two kinds of information 
from empirical studies are required for a clinical option to 
be fully evaluated. Information regarding real world 
effectiveness is essential to patients, practitioners and 
policy makers. At the same time, scientists and 
policymakers continue to need direct evidence of efficacy 
of interventions under research conditions. Such evidence  
reinforces confidence that those interventions’ intrinsic (as 
opposed to placebo) effects justify commitments of public 
resources, illuminate issues of mechanism of action that 
may inform or modify underlying pathophysiological 
hypotheses.  For full implementation within a particular 
practice setting, still an additional type of information is 
required, derived from one’s own practice experience [67].  
Hickey and Roberts appear entirely oblivious to these 
concepts, issues and developments. Our summary of them 
is not to be interpreted as a blanket defense of EBM in 
these respects. Mainstream EBM may constitute a 
traditional and conservative force in these domains. Some 
leading EBM proponents resist the importance of 
pragmatic clinical trials and observational evidence of real 
world effectiveness [68]. Even as it finds itself bending 
under the winds of change within the healthcare system, 
EBM is no longer the major source of disturbing 
provocation that it once was and may now, sometimes, 
constitute a voice of opposition to such provocations. A 
valid critique of the role of EBM in our time therefore 
requires attention to the current realities of healthcare, to 
the actual frontiers of research design and application and 
to the historical development of the relevant ideas and 
debates over the past 30 years. Tarnished Gold falls 
notably short on all of these counts. 
 
 
Scientific inference and clinical 
reasoning 
   
Several additional aspects of Hickey and Roberts’ 
wandering dissertation are worthy of brief note for the 
purpose of clarifying issues important to the contemporary 
evolution of healthcare. One of these has to do with the 
way that conclusions relevant to practice are drawn from a 
research report. For unclear reasons, perhaps motivated by 
the desire to discredit hypothesis driven trial design, the 
TG authors assert that “science is induction.” Quoting 
Ronald Fisher, Hickey and Roberts suggest that induction, 
in contrast to deduction, is the only valid scientific process 
through which new knowledge can be generated. They 
argue that induction, which derives theories through 
accumulation and synthesis of information from 
experience, is hypothesis generating, whereas deduction is 
limited to the testing of hypotheses. Not mentioned by 
Hickey and Roberts is the more complex and salient 
concept of “abductive reasoning”, developed over 130 
years ago by Charles Sanders Peirce [69], perhaps the 
founding father of modern clinical research methodology 
and inference.  
Peirce’s notion of abductive reasoning, much more 
than the notions of pure induction or pure deduction, 
encompasses the process through which empirical 
observations result in the perception of patterns of 
relationship and consequently hypotheses, which are then 
subjected to empirical testing.  Such reasoning happens 
through self-organizing cognitive processes, on both 
conscious and tacit levels. Hypotheses can only be refuted, 
not conclusively affirmed [70]. Refutation of hypotheses 
through rigorous empirical research then may result in 
appropriate challenges to the validity of the originally 
perceived patterns as well as of the premises upon which 
the corresponding hypotheses were formulated. Hence, 
“refutationism” [70] informs new and revised hypotheses 
regarding effectiveness and mechanisms of action. This is 
how scientific knowledge, mediated through informed 
social process, advances. 
At stake in this issue is the concept of a lawful 
interplay between foundational medical theory and 
understanding of empirical observations of real patients 
experiencing or avoiding important clinical outcomes 





under current circumstances of healthcare delivery. This 
interplay between rigorous efficacy trials, grass roots 
observational studies and basic science investigations, 
informed by practice-based research, is consistent with the 
germinal concepts of Peirce, but avoided by the linear 
dichotomies posited by Hickey and Roberts. 
Hickey and Roberts’ attempts to address the process of 
clinical reasoning on the part of an individual practitioner 
in his/her response to an individual patient are uninformed. 
What they, as individuals who are neither clinicians nor 
close to clinical medicine fail to acknowledge, is the tacit 
dimension of clinical cognition. Research on medical 
cognition is not new. Leading currents in cognitive 
psychology and its relationship to the development of 
clinical expertise have recognized that clinical problem-
solving and decision-making is complex and involves both 
inductive and deductive components [71,72], as well as 
differentiated cognitive structures termed “illness scripts” 
[72]. The latter reflect self-organizing processes 
commensurate with complexity theory, a domain to which 
the TG authors give credence, but to which they do little 
justice in the course of their denouncements of a single 





EBM began as a useful provocation, it became an 
ubiquitous and universally appealing ‘buzz term’ and 
marketing label and now has become a conservative 
influence on issues of research design in healthcare, even 
as its novelty fades into medical history. Diatribes against 
EBM usefully informed the process that was unleashed by 
its appearance and ironically increased its value by helping 
to clarify the issues.  Such diatribes today only serve to 
propel us into the past and to engage us with yesterday’s 
news. Aside from many useful approaches to the 
evaluation of clinical research, the valuable lessons to be 
learned from EBM are those to be distilled from the 
process that unfolded in the wake of its release. We 
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